Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1

Introduction
Occupational licensing represents a legal market entry barrier where a government mandates certain conditions under which professionals may enter. Individuals are typically required to undergo a specific training, pass a government test, or obtain a university degree. Occupational licensing has been justified by an intention to ensure minimum quality requirements. Certification, on the other hand, is an alternative policy that increases market transparency. Instead of requiring individuals to pass tests, or obtain training and educational degrees, the government provides voluntary options.
Professionals may then choose to fulfill the necessary steps in order to get certified, and thereby signal higher quality to customers, or they may choose not to pursue this route.
Occupational licensing has been steadily increasing in Europa and North America after WWII.
Particularly in the US, this expansionary tendency has not ceased after 1990 (Kleiner, 2006; Kleiner and Krueger, 2013) . On the other hand, the common market area of the European Union has led to an attempt to harmonize and reduce national licensing policies in order to enable the free movement of labor between countries (European Commission, 2013). In addition, there have been various national attempts to liberalize labor markets, as for example in Germany after 2004 . Williams (1982 introduced the argument that licensing costs are disproportionately borne by minority groups. If minorities have a harder time to acquire the skills and educational credentials prescribed by licensing requirements, they will be underrepresented in licensed markets. Empirical contributions confirm that labor market regulations in general (Feldmann, 2009; Feldmann, 2003) and licensing regulations in particular (Dorsey, 1983; Federman et al, 2006) affect minorities disproportionately by increasing the costs of entering licensed professions. Pashigian (1979) , Kleiner et al (1982) and Kleiner (2015) show that US interstate migration is reduced by licensing requirements; restricting the free flow of labor towards its most productive uses. While the latter set of papers examines within-country mobility, a similar process may unfold on the international level 2 as strict licensing rules could deter foreigners from entering the country. For example, while citizens of countries within the European Union are permitted to work in any of the member countries de jure occupational licensing may still constitute a de facto barrier to labor mobility.
While licensing has generally been expanding steadily during the 20 th century (Kleiner, 2006) , the German Government has begun to reverse this development. The so-called "Hartz Reforms" of 2004 selectively abolished licensing requirements for one group of occupations (B-trades) in the German crafts sector, whereas keeping another group of trades in that sector under full licensure (AC). A final group was partially deregulated (A-trades). This natural experiment allows me to study the effects of regulation on labor market participation of minority groups (i.e. migrants).
I use repeated cross-sections (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) of German microcensus data, which enables me to identify the groups of craftsmen and craftswomen that have been differentially affected by the reform. I use difference-in-differences regressions in order to estimate the effect of the reform on the likelihood of a migrant working in one of the three distinct occupational groups (AC, A, and B).
The empirical results are in line with the previous findings of the literature. For self-employed individuals within a deregulated crafts trade, the share of migrants increases by 4 to 8 percentage points as a results of the policy change. For employed craftsmen within a deregulated trade, the share of migrants increases by 5 to 8 percentage points. The increase of migrant workers among employed individuals takes place almost entirely among untrained professionals. The migrant share among trained craftsmen remains virtually constant. The proportion of migrants has increased more strongly for part-time than full-time jobs. Overall, the total number of migrants in the crafts sector has increased by more than 107,000 as a result of the reform. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Occupational licensing affects the share of migrants in the German crafts sector in two ways. The first (direct) mechanism pertains to self-employed individuals. The second (indirect) mechanism pertains to employed professionals. This section describes both mechanisms in turn and derives testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis below.
The lower educational attainment of migrants is one of the primary obstacles for entering the labor market (Borjas, 2014; Constant und Zimmermann, 2006, 297) . Migrants who desire to work in the crafts sector in Germany face the problem that the specific type of training (dual-training system) which leads to a crafts degree (Geselle or Meister) is not available in most countries of origin.
As a result, almost none of the German migrants were permitted to start a business in the crafts sector before the deregulation in 2004.
If migrants decide to undergo training after they have arrived in Germany, they may be disadvantaged by language deficits and insufficient schooling prerequisites, which may obstruct their way into the dual-training system. We thus expect migrants to have a lower probability of having a Meister degree. In fact, according to the nationally representative data set used in this analysis (described below), only about 5% of all migrants in the crafts sector hold a Meister degree, whereas about 14% of German craftsmen do. Thus, before 2004, migrants have been disproportionally excluded from entrepreneurial activity in the crafts sector. After the removal of these entry barriers the proportion of migrants among self-employed craftsmen can be expected to rise.
Hypothesis One
The deregulation of occupational licensing in the German crafts sector causes an increase in the proportion of self-employed migrants.
The secondary mechanism by which the share of migrants may be expected to increase pertains to employed craftsmen. As the deregulated crafts market exhibits lower entry barriers the number of companies will increase. This basic theoretical prediction has been supported by empirical work (Rostam-Afschar, 2014; Runst et al. 2016) . The increase in market entry is caused by companies which are owned by craftsmen without a Meister degree as they were the ones previously not 5 permitted to enter (Mueller, 2014 (Mueller, , 2015 . The new companies may charge lower prices in an attempt to compete with more established businesses. Thus, new market entrants may hire workers with lower qualification levels in order to pay lower wages. Thus, the likelihood of hiring migrants rises.
Hypothesis Two The deregulation of occupational licensing causes an increase in the proportion of migrants among untrained employees.
Finally, as the migrant share among the self-employed increases, social networks effects can lead to an increase in the share of migrant employees as well. This is because migrant business owners are most likely acquainted with other migrants and sociological studies suggest that social networks play an important role in job search processes (see Granovetter, 1973; Bian, 1997) .
While hypothesis two pertains to an increased demand for lower wage migrant labor, the social network mechanism pertains to all forms of migrant labor, including trained craftsmen.
Hypothesis Three
The deregulation of occupational licensing causes an increase in the proportion of migrants among trained employees. 
Data and Methods
German Microcensus Data & Sample Design
The empirical analysis is based on German microcensus data, provided by the Federal Statistical
Office. It is an annual and representative 1% sample of all households in Germany. The questions are designed to gather demographic and labor market information about all individuals possessing a legal residence permit in Germany. The survey does not follow the same individuals each year, thus it is organized as a repeated cross section. The annual scientific use files contain about 490,000
individuals. Since only about 12.5% of the German labor force is comprised of craftsmen, the sample size is nevertheless sufficiently large. The mandatory nature of the census survey guarantees a low rate of item-non-response for most questions.
I use pooled data for the years of 2002 until 2010. As this analysis pertains to labor market participation, individuals younger than 18 or older than 66 are excluded from the sample.
Furthermore, all non-craftsmen are dropped. After these preliminary steps have been taken, the sample contains about 25,000 craftsmen of working age per year.
The data set also contains information on the migration background of individuals, including the year of immigration into Germany, their nationality, and whether they possess the German citizenship. For the purpose of the present analysis, migrants are defined as individuals who immigrated to Germany during their life-time, regardless of whether they acquired the German citizenship since then or not. About three quarters of immigrants in the sample arrived after 1980 (see Figure 1 ).
Distinguishing Crafts & Non-Crafts Occupations
If one is to assess the implications of a particular policy change in the crafts sector, it is paramount that the sample only comprises individuals within this sector. It must not contain individuals in the agricultural, industrial or any other sector of the economy, all of which have not been directly affected by the 2004 reform of the Trades and Crafts Code (also see Runst et al., 2016) . The data set does not contain direct information on whether a professional works in the crafts sector. However, 7 craftsmen can be distinguished from non-craftsmen on the basis of the occupational classification code (KldB1992).
Rostam-Afschar (2014) already developed a crafts-classification procedure based on occupation codes in the microcensus (KldB1992). The author kindly provided me with his list of occupation codes. I analyzed this list in detail, because it constitutes an important attempt to make the microcensus data utilizable for studies focusing on the German crafts sector (see Runst et al., 2016) .
After thorough examination it must be concluded that the demarcation chosen by RA is too broad:
while it certainly includes many of the occupations that German craftsmen would practice, it also contains a large proportion of non-crafts individuals who are unaffected by the policy reform.
Therefore, I rely on a new classification system that is still based on the occupation codes of the microcensus (KldB1992) yet also uses additional information, allowing me to exclude a number of non-craft workers. Details on the procedure are provided in appendix A. The selection algorithm which identifies craftsmen and sorts them into one of the three categories (control: AC; treatment: A, B) is described in detail in appendix A.
The Development of Migrant Shares over Time
This section describes the development of the proportion of migrant professionals in the crafts sector ( Figure 2-4) . Each figure plots the share of migrants for the fully deregulated trades (B), the partially-deregulated trades (A) and the still regulates trades (AC). 
Estimation Procedure
The Table 2 displays the weighted averages for all variables by treatment group and pre-and post-reform period. The post-reform share of migrants is higher than the pre-reform share in treatment group A (5%) and B (8%). In contrast, the share of migrants in control group AC rises only by 2 percentage points. The share of women is lowest in A-trades, which includes the construction sector, and highest in AC-trades, which are mostly health related (opticians, orthopedic shoe makers, dental technicians, etc.). Secondary schooling and Meister-training is generally higher among AC-trades. Rates of selfemployment increase in both treatment groups in the post-policy period (see Rostam-Afschar, 2014; Runst, 2016) . The proportion of professionals with basic vocational training (Geselle) appears to increase uniformly across all three categories in the post-policy period. identical to the ones in specification (3). It can be concluded that, in accordance with hypothesis one, the deregulation of occupational licensing increased the proportion of migrants among selfemployed craftsmen by three to five percentage points. Table 4 displays regression results for employed craftsmen. Before omitting cleaners, the coefficients of the interaction term are equal to 0.02 for A-trades and 0.08 for B-trades (specification (1) and (2) 
Descriptive Statistics
Results & Robustness Checks
Regression results
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Among full-time employees, the proportions of migrants remained unaffected by the reform in the B-trades, whereas it increased slightly (0.02) in A trades (specification 4). Finally, among parttime employees, the reform does not appear to have affected the A-trades. However, the proportion of migrants has increased by 6 percentage points in B-trades.
Using the crafts statistics presented in Mueller (2015) and the regression coefficients above, I
calculate the total number of migrants, who are working in the crafts sector (self-employed and employed, with training and without training) as a result of the reform. I estimate that about 107,000
additional migrants have entered the crafts sector as a result of the reform.
Robustness Checks
In order to further assess the finding of the previous section, the models are re-estimated, varying the specification and the definition of variables. 
